Hi thanks for the write up. How sure are you about that shares o/s figure? 10-K filed today gives PF figures, $2.3m cash so you were bang on there, but says 82m PF shares o/s. Makes a big difference in terms of current creation multiple.
Interesting. I had figured it was just making a new class like your standard BK. Guess not. A lot of parts still unanswered but all good research starts with a foundation that shakes your normal understanding.
well written, thanks very much! btw if you happen to know a good open source xls model for HY, specifically to project coupon payments with running CFs, im a happy receiver 😀
Thanks for the idea. Is it fair to look at upside potential here as a function of FY19 EBITDA if the underlying contracts with the theaters have been changed / are at risk? What did the Company say in their first day materials about the role contract rejections and renegotiations, not just low attendance, played here? I don’t think we can start to discuss what normalized EBITDA will look like until there’s more clarity on what the business relationships with the theaters will look like going forward. It’s been unclear to me over the years why National CineMedia needs to exist; people wants to advertise at movie theaters, fine, but that’s separate from why this company needs to actually exist as a standalone to do this instead of within some other marketing business. Thoughts?
Thx for the write up. Any understanding of the financial impact of losing Regal cinema screens? As you might have seen, Cineworld (parent to Regal) filed BK and rejected the contracts with National Cinemedia jeopordizing 6,853 screens in United States which were a material element of NC's business.
Hi thanks for the write up. How sure are you about that shares o/s figure? 10-K filed today gives PF figures, $2.3m cash so you were bang on there, but says 82m PF shares o/s. Makes a big difference in terms of current creation multiple.
Interesting. I had figured it was just making a new class like your standard BK. Guess not. A lot of parts still unanswered but all good research starts with a foundation that shakes your normal understanding.
well written, thanks very much! btw if you happen to know a good open source xls model for HY, specifically to project coupon payments with running CFs, im a happy receiver 😀
Thanks for the idea. Is it fair to look at upside potential here as a function of FY19 EBITDA if the underlying contracts with the theaters have been changed / are at risk? What did the Company say in their first day materials about the role contract rejections and renegotiations, not just low attendance, played here? I don’t think we can start to discuss what normalized EBITDA will look like until there’s more clarity on what the business relationships with the theaters will look like going forward. It’s been unclear to me over the years why National CineMedia needs to exist; people wants to advertise at movie theaters, fine, but that’s separate from why this company needs to actually exist as a standalone to do this instead of within some other marketing business. Thoughts?
Buy Screenvision 1L?
Thx for the write up. Any understanding of the financial impact of losing Regal cinema screens? As you might have seen, Cineworld (parent to Regal) filed BK and rejected the contracts with National Cinemedia jeopordizing 6,853 screens in United States which were a material element of NC's business.